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Abstract
This article investigates a widespread yet understudied trend in EU politics: 
the shift of legislative decision making from public inclusive to informal se-
cluded arenas and the subsequent adoption of legislation as “early agree-
ments.” Since its introduction in 1999, “fast-track legislation” has increased 
dramatically, accounting for 72% of codecision files in the Sixth European 
Parliament. Drawing from functionalist institutionalism, distributive bargain-
ing theory, and sociological institutionalism, this article explains under what 
conditions informal decision making is likely to occur. The authors test their 
hypotheses on an original data set of all 797 codecision files negotiated 
between mid-1999 and mid-2009. Their analysis suggests that fast-track leg-
islation is systematically related to the number of participants, legislative 
workload, and complexity. These findings back a functionalist argument, 
emphasizing the transaction costs of intraorganizational coordination and in-
formation gathering. However, redistributive and salient acts are regularly 
decided informally, and the Council presidency’s priorities have no significant 
effect on fast-track legislation. Hence, the authors cannot confirm explana-
tions based on issue properties or actors’ privileged institutional positions. 
Article
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Finally, they find a strong effect for the time fast-track legislation has been used, 
suggesting socialization into interorganizational norms of cooperation.
Keywords
European Parliament, fast-track legislation, informal politics, functionalist 
institutionalism, distributive bargaining, socialization
This article investigates a widespread yet understudied trend in European 
Union (EU) politics: the shift of legislative decision making from public inclu-
sive to restricted secluded arenas and the resulting “informalization” of the 
political process. Informalization is particularly prominent in the codecision 
procedure—“ordinary legislative procedure” post-Lisbon—and it is puzzling 
scholars and practitioners alike. Indeed, since the possibility to conclude code-
cision at first reading was introduced in 1999, an ever-increasing percentage 
of legislation has been adopted “early” by the two colegislators, the European 
Parliament (EP) and the Council of the European Union. Such “early conclu-
sion” accounted for 72% in the 2004–2009 parliamentary term.
This increase in early conclusion has two repercussions. First, to agree a 
file early, a legislative compromise must be reached prior to the EP’s first 
reading. This compromise is negotiated informally by a restricted and secluded 
group of representatives from EP, Council, and European Commission. 
Second, the procedure is “fast-tracked,” as legislation is adopted after one 
rather than three possible readings. This trend toward informal decision mak-
ing and fast-tracked legislation is particularly puzzling when assessed against 
the backdrop of EU institutional reform. Over the past two decades, Parliament 
has been promoted to a genuine colegislator, not least to address the EU’s 
“democratic deficit” through a more open and inclusive legislative process. 
Yet the transformation of codecision has refuted both the concerns and expec-
tations raised when the procedure was introduced in 1993. Contrary to con-
cerns about its complexity, codecision has proved highly efficient in terms of 
legislative output; contrary to expectations of greater accountability, inclu-
siveness, and transparency, the routine use of fast-track legislation has led to 
seclusion from the electorate and rank-and-file parliamentarians.
Our article attempts to explain this puzzling trend in supranational politics 
by addressing a question that is relevant beyond the study of EU legislation: 
Under what conditions will decision making be shifted from formal inclusive 
to informal secluded arenas?
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This question is warranted for two reasons. First, the sheer volume of first 
reading agreements, increasing from 22% of codecision acts adopted in 1999 
to 86% in 2009, begs for empirical investigation, theoretical explanation, and 
normative evaluation. At the same time, we know little about how fast-tracked 
legislation is agreed, under which conditions it occurs, and what the political 
and democratic consequences are. There is extensive scholarly debate about 
the legislative influence of, and the distribution of power between, the EU’s 
colegislators (see, e.g., Kreppel, 1999; Tsebelis & Garrett, 2000), but only 
one contribution has studied legislative influence under informal procedures 
(Häge & Kaeding, 2007). More generally, although practitioners have dis-
cussed fast-track legislation and its challenges (Shackleton, 2000; Shackleton 
& Raunio, 2003), few academic studies have analyzed how the formal rule 
change plays out in the legislative praxis. Two notable exceptions are Farrell 
and Héritier’s (2004) study on intraorganizational relations and institutional 
reform in Council and Parliament and Rasmussen’s (2011) explanation of 
early conclusion from 1999 to 2004.
Second, the recourse to fast-track legislation exemplifies a wider trend 
toward secluded policy making, national as well as supranational, that com-
bines informalization with new forms of openness and inclusion and challenges 
traditional democratic patterns in Europe (Bedock, Mair, & Wilson, 2011). On 
one hand, political decision makers are “sealed off” from their wider con-
stituencies and elected representatives; on the other hand, decision making is 
opened up through direct democratic procedures, transparency, and civil soci-
ety involvement. Similarly, scholars of international relations have noted a 
new trend toward informalization (Daase, 2009). This trend is not only visi-
ble in states’ informal cooperation and agreement inside international organi-
zations, such as the United Nations Security Council or the African Group in 
the World Trade Organization. What is more, decisions previously taken 
within formal organizations are increasingly shifted outside; two prominent 
examples are informal pre–decision making in the G8 and the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (Daase, 2009, p. 294, pp. 300-301). Although our article’s 
empirical focus is exclusively on EU legislation, our theoretical framework 
is developed so as to address these wider trends and to explain why decision 
makers systematically choose informal over formal arenas.
The article proceeds in the following steps. The first part conceptualizes 
informal decision making. The second part introduces the informal politics of 
codecision. The third part develops three explanations of informal decision 
making: a functionalist argument stressing efficiency, a distributive bargain-
ing argument emphasizing institutional power, and a sociological argument 
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suggesting socialization into interorganizational cooperation. We test our 
hypotheses on an original data set, based on the full population of the 797 
codecision files concluded between mid-1999 (when fast-track legislation was 
introduced) and mid-2009 (when the last parliamentary term ended). The fourth 
part discusses the data set, operationalization, and measurement. The fifth part 
submits the hypotheses to a statistical test. Our findings suggest that the deci-
sion to “go informal” is systematically related to the number of negotiation 
participants, legislative workload, complexity, and the time informal rules 
have been used. However, we find no link between fast-track legislation and 
policy type, issue saliency, and the priorities of the Council presidency. The 
article concludes by discussing the wider implications of our findings.
Formal and Informal Decision Making
Our conceptual definition begins with three caveats. First, our article focuses 
on informal and secluded processes played out as a part of, rather than outside 
of, a formal institutional framework. More specifically, we look at instances 
where formal rules of cooperation leave informal spaces that decision makers 
can—but need not—choose to fill. In spite of its interest in informalization, 
the article is thus squarely placed within the study of “formal politics,” as 
“the Government and the process of governing narrowly conceived” (Hay, 
2002, p. 70).1 Second, the analysis is confined to decision making as that stage 
in a political process during which actors, operating under set institutional 
constraints, choose binding outcomes or identify preferred options. Our defi-
nition is, accordingly, too restricted to encompass mere consultation (e.g., of 
interest groups) or interaction outside the framework set by formal institu-
tions (e.g., clientelism and corruption); it also differs from informal gover-
nance as “the operation of networks of individual and collective, private and 
public actors” (Christiansen, Føllesdal, & Piattoni, 2003, p. 7). Third, we do 
not claim that informal decision making is novel or normatively problematic 
per se. Choosing to use informal spaces may be not only legitimate but also 
expected from decision makers, and it is difficult to imagine a system doing 
altogether without informal politics when applying its formal rules.
In this article, we assume that decision makers have a degree of choice 
over whether and to what extent they “go informal,” and we try to explain 
their choice. In so doing, we delimit the informal arena from its formal variant 
along four dimensions: (a) nature and status of rules, (b) boundaries of partici-
pation, (c) scope and outcomes, and (d) access (see Figure 1).
First, informal and formal arenas differ with regard to the nature and status 
of rules. According to the standard definition, institutions are man-made rules 
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and procedures that “define and limit the choices of individuals” (North, 1990, 
p. 4). Rules more specifically are prescriptions “used by a set of participants to 
order repetitive, interdependent relationships”; they specify what is “requested, 
prohibited, or permitted” (Ostrom, 1986, p. 5). Prescriptions in the informal 
arena differ from those in the formal arena with regard to comprehensiveness, 
codification, and enforceability. Formal decision arenas are structured by a 
configuration of codified rules, specifying the positions, boundaries, scope, 
authority, and aggregation of an “action situation” (Ostrom, 1986, p. 19). 
Informal decision arenas, by contrast, are structured by noncodified rules and 
one or more dimensions of an action situation can be underspecified or not 
covered (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004; Knight, 1992; Lauth, 2000). Enforcement 
also works differently. Formal rules can be enforced by a third party; informal 
rules are “created, communicated and enforced outside the officially sanc-
tioned channels” (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 727). Hence, opportunities and 
constraints for action differ in the informal arena. On one hand, decision 
makers face fewer codified and enforceable constraints on how they are 
required, prohibited, or permitted to act; on the other hand, constraints on what 
their actions can affect are tighter, since enabling rules, too, will be noncodi-
fied and nonenforceable by a third party (Ostrom, 1986, p. 17).
Second, informal and formal arenas differ with regard to their boundaries 
of participation, in particular inclusiveness, codification, and public knowl-
edge. Membership in the formal arena is either inclusive or formally restricted. 
Decision Making 
(choice of binding outcomes or selection of preferred options)
Formal Arena Informal Arena
 formal rules (codified and enforced
through official channels) 
 inclusive participation or formally
restricted boundaries
 outcome: binding decisions
 public access or justified seclusion
 informal rules (non codified and
enforced outside official channels) 
 restricted participation and unofficially
drawn boundaries
 outcome: requires formalization
 seclusion 
complementary (where informal decision making is endogenous to the formal process)
substitutive (where informal decision making is exogenous to the formal process)
Figure 1. Formal and informal decision making.
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The formal political process includes all legitimate decision makers (or allows 
for inclusion even if actors choose not to partake), or it involves a formally 
restricted subset of actors. No matter whether membership is inclusive or 
restricted, it is publicly known who participates (or is allowed to participate). 
By contrast, participation in the informal arena is both restricted and noncodi-
fied; the process involves a limited group of actors, and the boundaries of 
membership are neither formally drawn nor publicly known.
Third, informal and formal arenas differ with regard to their scope of action, 
defined as “the set of outcomes that may be affected” (Ostrom, 1986, p. 19). 
When acting in the informal arena, decision makers produce intermediate 
rather than final outcomes. Thus, in functioning democracies—and contrary to 
dysfunctional systems—the two arenas are asymmetrically dependent. Final 
and binding decisions can emanate from the formal process only, and any 
agreement reached informally must be legitimized through formalization. Yet 
even under such conditions, the informal arena can significantly constrain 
how much is left to be decided and justified in the formal arena.
Fourth, informal and formal arenas differ with regard to public access. 
Such differences pertain to the physical or virtual access to deliberation, 
negotiation, and documentation and to whether access restrictions must be 
publicly justified. In the formal process, decision makers will generally meet 
in public; in the informal process, decision makers will generally be sealed 
off. Yet even where the formal arena is secluded, documentation about the 
decision process will be available or the restricted access to negotiation or 
documentation will be justified. By contrast, the informal decision arena 
can be systematically secluded, and access can be denied without public 
justification.
The Informal Politics of Codecision
Understanding informal decision making and explaining why it occurs has 
become imperative for anyone who studies the process and outcome of EU 
legislation. Under codecision, informalization and seclusion are corollaries 
of the dramatic increase in legislation agreed at first or early second reading.
Our article explains this striking trend by analyzing the use of “early agree-
ments” (EAs) through an original data set of all 797 codecision acts concluded 
between mid-1999 and mid-2009 (see Figure 2). To qualify as an EA, an act 
must meet two conditions: (a) it is fast-tracked, that is, concluded at either 
first or early second reading; (b) it is based on an informal compromise 
between the colegislators.
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Figure 2. Early Agreements and early conclusion (1999–2009).
This analytical focus is justified for the following reasons. The stage of 
conclusion is a necessary but insufficient indicator of how an agreement was 
reached. It is necessary because only acts concluded at first or early second 
reading hinge on a systematic shift of decision making into the informal arena. 
The mechanism behind an early first reading agreement is the following: 
After the Commission has tabled its legislative proposal, representatives of 
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Parliament, Council, and Commission enter into informal negotiations, known 
as “trilogues.” These negotiations take place before the EP issues its formal 
opinion and before the Council adopts its common position, which are the first 
two steps in the formal process. If Council and Parliament reach an informal 
compromise, the EP includes the Council’s propositions in its own first read-
ing amendments, adopted by simple majority. Subsequently, the Council 
accepts the Commission proposal as amended by Parliament. The procedure is 
closed, and the act adopted accordingly. An early second reading agreement is 
possible when the EP, at its second reading, adopts—rather than amends—the 
Council’s common position, based on the prior incorporation of amendments 
suggested by Parliament. At this stage, the informal compromise is reached 
after the EP holds its first reading and before the Council adopts its common 
position.
However, the stage of conclusion alone is an insufficient indicator of 
informalization. First and early second reading deals, by definition, require 
rubber-stamping. Rubber-stamping can be the upshot of an informally nego-
tiated compromise, but it can also result from the absence of legislative con-
flict. Given our driving interest—the choice of informal decision making 
rather than the stage of conclusion per se—we therefore focus only on those 
fast-tracked files that result from informal compromise on a contested act. 
These acts are ideally suited proxies for decision makers’ choice to “go informal” 
and examples of informal decision making as conceptualized above.
Under codecision, informalization is in line with—and in application of—
the Treaty. Informal decision making thus plays out within the EU’s formal 
legislative process, from which it is distinct along all four dimensions intro-
duced above: A restricted, noncodified set of decision makers operates in a 
secluded setting, social interaction is structured by informal rather than codi-
fied and enforceable rules, and informal compromise must be legitimized 
through the formal process.
Legislative compromise is reached in trilogues. In contrast to the parlia-
mentary plenary and Council meetings, trilogues are limited; in contrast to EP 
committees, membership is not officially defined or publicly known. When 
EAs became possible—and trilogues necessary—interinstitutional agree-
ments and intraorganizational guidelines merely talked about “appropriate 
contacts” (European Parliament, Council, & Commission, 1999), and mem-
bership in the informal negotiation arena was to be decided ad hoc (European 
Parliament, 2004).
Furthermore, the rules structuring informal interaction differ in nature and 
status from formal rules. The decision situation is not clearly defined, and 
participants and positions in trilogues are underspecified and flexible, as are 
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communication channels and available information. Furthermore, the infor-
mal “rules of engagement” (Shackleton, 2000) are created and enforced out-
side official channels. Where such rules are written, they are very general—such 
as the 1999 and 2007 interinstitutional Joint Declaration on Practical 
Arrangements for the Codecision Procedure—or have limited binding 
force—such as the EP’s internal guidelines on how to colegislate. In 2009, a 
Code of Conduct for Negotiating Codecision Files became part of the EP’s 
codified Rules of Procedure; previously, behavioral constraints stemmed 
only from the need to reach intraorganizational consensus and to formalize 
informal compromise.
Indeed, decision makers can reach agreement in trilogues, yet any such 
agreement is intermediate until formalized by the EP’s plenary and a min-
isterial Council. At the same time, rubber-stamping is a pre-condition for early 
conclusion. Under codecision, the informal compromise therefore constrains 
formal decision making to a significant extent. Formally, Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) continue to have the right to table amendments 
to the informal compromise, both in committee and plenary; de facto, how-
ever, they face considerable political pressure not to challenge an informal 
deal (Rasmussen & Shackleton, 2005).
Finally, trilogues are both informal and secluded. Access is highly restric-
tive, for members of the public and for MEPs who are not party to the parlia-
mentary negotiation team. Information on the decision process is limited to 
feedback given by trilogue members to their respective committees, and docu-
mentation on the decision process is not publicly available. Trilogues are thus 
both inaccessible and intransparent, and their seclusion has been neither justi-
fied publicly nor decided formally.
The increase in early conclusion has been widely noticed in the Brussels 
policy community (for example see European Parliament, 2009) but has 
drawn little academic attention. There are, however, four notable exceptions: 
Farrell and Héritier’s studies of fast-track legislation (Farrell & Héritier, 2003) 
and intraorganizational power shifts (Farrell & Héritier, 2004), Häge and 
Kaeding’s (2007) analysis of the EP’s legislative influence in trilogues, and 
Rasmussen’s (2011) explanation of first reading deals in the Fifth EP. Our 
article builds on, yet goes beyond, these studies. First, the period analyzed is 
more comprehensive; our data set runs from 1999 to 2009 and covers the two 
completed parliamentary terms during which fast-track legislation was used. 
Second, our dependent variable is both wider and more specific; it comprises 
early second reading agreements (in addition to first reading deals), but it 
includes only those acts that were negotiated informally (rather than all proce-
dures concluded early). Third, by addressing the wider question of why 
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decision makers “go informal,” we aim to contribute to the study of informal-
ization and seclusion beyond the confines of EU legislative politics.
To give a better sense of the scope and extent of informal politics under 
codecision, we next present a descriptive statistical overview of EAs since 
1999. The next section follows up on this account by theorizing the reasons for 
informal decision making.
Table 1 shows the number and percentage of EAs per type of legislation. 
The use of EAs varies significantly—from 93% and 64% for procedures 
adapting legislation to the regulatory procedure with scrutiny and for recast 
legislation, to 15% for procedures extending the operation of existing legisla-
tion. EAs are not used for repeal and codification. The former can be explained 
by lacking contestation; the latter by the legislative trajectory: Codification 
replaces existing legislation without substantive change, and negotiation is 
delegated to the colegislators’ legal services.
Differences also pertain to the duration of procedures. The average dura-
tion of all 797 codecision procedures—from tabling of proposal to publica-
tion of final act—is almost 21 months. As Table 2 shows, the average duration 
Table 1. Early Agreements Across Type of Legislation.
No EA EA  
 Freq % Freq % Total
New legislation 182 62.8 108 37.2 290
Amendment of content 162 61.8 100 38.2 262
New with repealed legislation 44 57.9 32 42.1 76
Codification 55 100.0 0 0.0 55
Adaptation to comitology 3 7.0 40 93.0 43
Recast legislation 14 35.9 25 64.1 39
Extension in time 22 84.6 4 15.4 26
Repealed legislation 6 100.0 0 0.0 6
Total 488 309 797
Note. EA = Early Agreements
Table 2. Early Agreements and the Duration of Codecision.
Average duration (months) Total number
Procedure without EA 23.5 488
Procedure with EA 16.2 309
All procedures 20.7 797
Note. EA = Early Agreements
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of “formal procedures” is 23.5 months; although the time limits specified 
in the Treaty do not apply prior to first reading, the average duration of 
“informal procedures” is slightly more than 16 months.
EAs also vary across EP committees. Table 3 lists the number and percent-
age of EAs for committees that have dealt with more than 25 codecision proce-
dures.2 Although the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 
(LIBE) concluded 75% of its procedures early, the Committees on Economic 
and Monetary Affairs (ECON), Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL), 
Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO), and Culture and Education 
(CULT) adopted about half of their acts as EAs. With 43% and 39%, respec-
tively, EAs are less common in the Committees on the Environment, Public 
Health and Food Safety (ENVI) and Legal Affairs (JURI), and they are used 
least in the Committees on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) and Transport 
and Tourism (TRAN), with 36% and 31%, respectively.
Theorizing the Use of Early Agreements
To answer the question why actors “go informal” under codecision, we 
develop three theoretical arguments: a functionalist argument stressing effi-
ciency gains, a distributive bargaining argument emphasizing gains of insti-
tutional power, and a sociological argument suggesting socialization into 
interorganizational norms of cooperation.
The first two arguments are drawn from rational choice institutionalism 
and assume boundedly rational actors, utility maximization, and transaction 
costs. Both the functionalist and the power-based bargaining approach also 
Table 3. Early Agreements (EAs) Across EP Committees.
Nonearly Early  
 Freq % Freq % Total
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) 11 25.0 33 75.0 44
Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) 35 46.7 40 53.3 75
Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) 17 50.0 17 50.0 34
Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) 18 50.0 18 50.0 36
Culture and Education (CULT) 20 51.3 19 48.7 39
Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) 87 57.2 65 42.8 152
Legal Affairs (JURI) 48 61.5 30 38.5 78
Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) 46 63.9 26 36.1 72
Transport and Tourism (TRAN) 65 69.2 29 30.9 94
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conceptualize rules as incomplete contracts. Given uncertainty about the 
world and future contingencies, and given informational asymmetries about 
others’ actions and intentions, actors are concerned about the long-term distri-
butional consequences of their choices (Koremenos, 2005; Lake & Powell, 
1999). Actors therefore hesitate to commit to detailed contracts, fully specify-
ing all responsibilities and obligations and anticipating every possible contin-
gency (Cooley & Spruyt, 2007, p. 8). Instead, they prefer rules as incomplete 
contracts. These can be adjusted to external circumstances when they are 
applied (Héritier, 1999) and allow actors to correct distributional asymme-
tries ensuing from their initial agreement (Cooley & Spruyt, 2007, p. 9; 
Koremenos, 2005).
To explain the transformation of incomplete institutional rules over 
time, the functionalist perspective argues that extant rules are adjusted to 
save transaction costs of information, negotiation, and monitoring. Faced 
with a collective action problem, actors calculate the expected benefits of 
a rule change and subtract the transaction costs of negotiating the change. 
If this cost–benefit calculation is positive, actors will agree on a specific 
rule change, which is—on balance—considered beneficial for all.
Where actors’ preferences are diverse, the transaction costs of negotiation 
are likely to increase with the number of participants. In EU decision making, 
widening membership through enlargement will therefore augment the costs 
of information gathering and bargaining, and new member states will add to 
the costs of negotiating legislation under codecision (Hertz & Leuffen, 2011; 
Rasmussen, 2011, p. 52). For the colegislators, transaction costs of accom-
modating more diverse policy preferences arise in particular from the need to 
coordinate internal positions within their respective organizations. Yet 
specific institutional conditions may help actors to save such transaction 
costs and thus influence their decision to “go informal.” The adoption of 
an EA requires only a simple majority of votes in Parliament. This decision 
rule, therefore, helps Parliament to save the increasing costs of internal 
coordination.
We therefore submit,
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The likelihood of EA will increase if the overall 
number of participants in the negotiating organizations increases.
Transaction costs rise not only with the number of participants but also 
with the number and complexity of legislative files (also see Rasmussen, 
2011, p. 52). A high workload pushes the costs of information gathering up. 
If legislative dossiers, in addition, involve uncertainty about substantive 
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cause-and-effect relations—as is the case with complex and regulatory- 
technical issues—their negotiation requires special expertise as well as con-
siderable time and effort. At the same time, the distributive implications of 
complex and regulatory-technical dossiers are less obvious, and such files 
are less likely to attract public interest and trigger political conflict. Hence, 
where the transaction costs of a heavy legislative agenda and issue complexity 
combine with the absence of broad political controversy, legislators will 
move into the informal arena where they can save transaction costs and take 
decisions more speedily.
We therefore expect,
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The likelihood of EA will increase if the overall 
number of legislative files under negotiation increases.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): An EA is more likely where the legislative issue is 
complex and regulatory-technical.
As a corollary, we expect the opposite where legislative issues are likely 
to raise public interest and political opposition. Such issues will not be decided 
informally because EP and Council constituencies will demand broad and 
public legislative debate. We expect such demands to be particularly pro-
nounced where issues are salient or redistributive. Where issues are salient, 
interest and opposition derive from a dossier’s relation to sovereignty or from 
its strong symbolic relevance; where issues are redistributive, interest and 
opposition derive from the fact that some social groups bear costs to the 
benefit of others (also see Rasmussen, 2011, p. 52).
We therefore propose,
Hypothesis 4 (H4): An EA is less likely where a legislative issue is salient.
Hypothesis 5 (H5): An EA is less likely where a legislative issue is 
redistributive.
The functionalist explanation of institutional outcomes has been criticized 
for being too automatic (Héritier, 2007; Knight, 1992; Mattli, 1999). In our 
case, it claims that the transaction costs of widening membership, legislative 
workload, and regulatory complexity lead to changed decision making, that 
is, to fast-track legislation. Actors’ unequal power—derived from institutional 
structures at t1 when an adjustment of incomplete contracts is negotiated—is 
not taken into account.
Power-based distributive bargaining theory focuses on precisely this 
aspect. The theory assumes that actors are competence maximizers; while 
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seeking to increase the efficiency of an institutional rule, they also try to maxi-
mize institutional power and, thus, influence over policy outcomes (Héritier, 
2007). Although a changed rule increases overall benefits by enabling coop-
eration, these benefits may not be distributed evenly. Actors will, accordingly, 
press for the use of those procedures that increase their benefits, and the final 
rule is the outcome of a bargaining process (Knight, 1992, p. 27). In explain-
ing the outcome of this process, power takes center stage. The actor’s (ex ante 
defined) power is reflected in her or his availability of fallback options where 
bargaining fails (Knight, 1992, pp. 41-42) and in an actor’s time horizon or 
preference intensity. Moreover, if an actor has a residual right to specify the 
terms of the incomplete contract at t2, she or he will have more power in shap-
ing the outcome of the implicit negotiations (Cooley & Spruyt, 2007).
Under the EU’s codecision procedure, some actors will, therefore, have a 
strong interest in using EAs, because—under the extant institutional rule— 
“going informal” increases their influence. Holding the rotating Council 
presidency is such an institutional rule.
Established in 1957, the presidency initially had few responsibilities. Over 
time, however, it has obtained important functions in the management of the 
Council’s legislative agenda, mediation, and brokerage between member 
states as well as external representation (Tallberg, 2006). The growing frag-
mentation of Council decision making and the Commission’s declining 
capacity to define the agenda further increased the need for coordination, and 
in the 1980s presidencies began to define priorities for their terms in the chair 
(Tallberg, 2006). When codecision was introduced, the presidency became 
the most important interlocutor with Parliament. Joint decision making, thus, 
further empowered the presidency as the actor negotiating in the interorgani-
zational arena and controlling information flows (Farrell & Héritier, 2004). 
The rotation principle—ensuring that all member states get their turn in the 
chair—allows for this temporary concentration of power. In short, the 6-month 
Council presidency is an opportunity for, and an incentive to, shape decisions 
and realize policy preferences by way of fast-track legislation (Farrell & 
Héritier, 2003, 2004).
We therefore submit,
Hypothesis 6 (H6): An EA is more likely where the legislative file is an 
ex ante defined priority of the Council presidency.
Our third theoretical explanation of informal decision making derives 
from sociological institutionalism. This approach allows us to explain the 
steep rise in fast-track legislation over time, following decision makers’ initial 
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choice of informal rules—be this to save the transaction costs of coordina-
tion, to gain policy influence, or to foster a constructive negotiation climate. 
Sociological institutionalism assumes that actors are firmly anchored in an 
organizational and social context (Johnston, 2001); it is this context with its 
specific expectations of appropriate behavior that defines their available 
choice repertoire (March & Olsen, 1989, 1998). To explain why actors con-
sider a particular set of decision rules as their most appropriate choice, socio-
logical institutionalists turn to the mechanism of socialization, defined as the 
“process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community” 
(Checkel, 2005, p. 804; Johnston, 2001, pp. 494-506).
In international negotiation, repeated and time-demanding interaction in 
small, secluded settings has been shown to foster socialization into coopera-
tive and constructive behavior (Checkel, 2001). Trilogues in fast-track leg-
islation are such settings. Under codecision—introduced amid institutional 
competition between Parliament and Council—negotiation in trilogues can 
therefore facilitate cooperation between the two colegislators, by creating 
“mutual confidence, and positive trust spirals” and by augmenting “skills at 
political compromise” (March & Olsen, 1998, p. 960). Once decision making 
has been successfully shifted into such an arena, and once decision makers 
have become socialized into using the rules of interorganizational coopera-
tion, “going informal” will be considered as the appropriate choice. If the 
sociological explanation holds, we should, therefore, see fast-track legislation 
increase with the length of time informal rules have been used (also see 
Rasmussen, 2011, p. 51); in contrast to the functionalist argument suggested 
above, this expectation should hold across negotiations, independent of issue 
properties, policy area, and saliency.
We therefore submit,
Hypothesis 7 (H7): The likelihood of EA increases with the time codeci-
sion has been in use, independent of policy area, issue saliency, and 
institutional preferences.
Research Design
Our data set contains all codecision procedures concluded in the Fifth and 
Sixth EP. Fast-track legislation has been formally possible since the entry into 
force of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, and this year is our starting point. 
Based on the EP’s Legislative Observatory, we included all codecision pro-
cedures completed between July 20, 1999, and July 17, 2009, which results 
in 797 procedures.
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Our analysis seeks to explain the likelihood of EA under codecision. As 
detailed above, an EA meets two conditions: (a) it is concluded at first or early 
second reading and (b) it results from informal compromise between the 
colegislators. These conditions were identified as follows. First, we singled 
out all first and second reading agreements. Second, we searched the proce-
dural files of these dossiers for evidence of informal compromise (also see 
Yordanova, 2010, chap. 6). Third, we selected those dossiers concluded 
early that resulted from informal compromise. Informal compromise prior to 
first reading is indicated by formulations such as “[t]he amendments are the 
result of a compromise between Parliament and Council . . . ,” “[i]n accor-
dance with the compromise reached at first reading . . . ,” and “[f]ollowing a 
first reading agreement with the European Parliament, the Council adopted 
this Regulation.” Before second reading, formulations include “[t]he com-
mon position . . . reflects the compromise text agreed by all three institutions 
. . .” or “[t]he common position is the result of intense inter-institutional 
negotiations. . . .” Only where we found such evidence for files concluded at 
first or early second reading did we code them positively as EAs. Of the 797 
procedures in our data set, 309 procedures were EAs, 275 of which were 
concluded at first and 34 at early second reading stage.
Our statistical models include the following explanatory variables.
H1 is tested with the variable enlargement. This dichotomous variable 
takes the value 0 if the codecision file was concluded before May 1, 2004, and 
the value 1 if it was concluded thereafter (also see Best & Settembri, 2008, p. 
186). In spite of the EU’s enlargement to two new member states in 2007, we 
focused on 2004 for two reasons. Theoretically, H1 derives from a functional-
ist argument, linking increased transaction costs to an increased number of 
negotiation participants. The 2004 “big bang” enlargement from the EU-15 to 
the EU-25 was an exceptionally steep increase and is therefore uniquely suited 
to test H1. Furthermore, this choice follows established scholarship on post-
accession decision making, which treats 2004 as the defining increase in 
group size (see Bailer, Hertz, & Leuffen, 2009, for an overview).
H2 is tested with the proxy variable workload presidency, defined as the 
number of ongoing procedures during each Council presidency (also see 
Rasmussen, 2011, p. 52).
To test H3 and H5, we created three variables. First, two variables capture 
complexity. The continuous variable recitals measures the number of recitals 
in the Commission’s legislative proposal. Committee opinion measures the 
number of EP committees consulted on the dossier.3 Second, to capture regu-
latory-technical and redistributive files, we identified the procedure’s policy 
type.4 Based on the Commission proposal, we classified a procedure as regu-
latory-technical if it has no redistributive consequences; requires member 
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states to provide information, coordinate, or harmonize legislation; or makes 
recommendations. We created a dummy variable for this category. For H5, 
we constructed two additional dummies to capture files with a redistributive 
element. If the Commission proposal mentions no funds but if obligations 
affect a particular group, the file was coded “regulatory, redistributive”; if 
the proposal mentions funds that are offered to a particular group, the file 
was coded as “redistributive.” Third, we created two interaction variables 
between complexity and regulatory-technical policy type.5
The effect of H4 is tested with the variable media. We used LexisNexis 
Academic to calculate the average number of times a file was mentioned in the 
relevant English-, French-, German-, and Italian-language print media (see 
Table 4).6 Keywords for the search were the file’s official title or its “public 
nickname” (e.g., “Services Directive”).
H6 is assessed with the variable preference presidency. To code this vari-
able, we searched for an explicit mention of—or an unambiguous reference 
to—the legislative file in the program of the Council presidency concluding 
the legislation. Yet as negotiating an EA can take longer than one presidency’s 
term, our search also included the legislative priorities of the preceding presi-
dency. Our dichotomous measure takes the value 1 where the legislative file 
falls within the remit of one or both programs; otherwise, it is coded as 0.
Finally, H7 is tested with the variable time in use. This continuous variable 
ranges from 1 to 10 and indicates the number of years fast-track legislation 
has been formally possible (also see Rasmussen, 2011, p. 51).
In addition to our explanatory variables, our models include three control 
variables.
Anticipation was included in view of the anticipation effect found prior to 
EU enlargement (Leuffen & Hertz, 2010). We identified two moments of key 
importance for the colegislators: the EP elections of 2004—resulting in a new 
and enlarged Parliament—and of 2009. As we expect anticipation to set in 
before each event, we took a procedure’s average duration as our anticipation 
period.7 This variable takes the value 1 for all procedures concluded in the 20.7 
months before the two EP elections. We expect a particularly strong anticipation 
effect prior to the 2004 EP elections, which coincide with potential anticipation 
of enlargement (Leuffen & Hertz, 2010, p. 67).
Furthermore, two measures capture the proximity of Council and EP nego-
tiators. First, policy distance was introduced as fast-track legislation depends 
on “the level of mutual trust, political understanding, etc. between . . . key 
negotiators, which might be higher if they come from the same party family” 
(Rasmussen, 2011, p. 51). We singled out the EP’s rapporteur and the national 
minister presiding over the responsible Council as key negotiators. Using 
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Table 4. Operationalization of Explanatory and Control Variables.
Variable Description Source
H1: Enlargement Was the procedure concluded before or 
after May 1, 2004? 0 = before, 1 = after
Legislative Observatory
H2: Workload Total number of ongoing codecision 
procedures during the 6-month presidency 
concluding the act
Legislative Observatory
H3: Recitals Number of recitals in the Commission 
proposal
Commission Proposal
Committee opinion Number of committees asked for an opinion 
on the proposal
Legislative Observatory
Regulatory-technical Is the file regulatory-technical by nature? 0 
= no, 1 = yes
Commission Proposal
H4: Media Average number of newspaper articles 
referring to the codecision procedure in 
English-, French-, German-, and Italian-
language newspapers (United Kingdom: 
Daily Mail, Guardian, Independent, The 
Observer, The Sun, The Times; Ireland: The 
Irish Times; France: L’Express, Le Figaro, Le 
Monde, Le Monde.fr, Libération, L’Indépendent; 
Belgium: L’Echo; Germany: Frankfurter 
Rundschau, Financial Times Deutschland, 
Der Tagesspiegel, Die Tageszeitung, Die Welt; 
Austria: Der Standard, Die Presse; Italy: 
Corriere, La Stampa, La Nazione, Il Resto del 
Carlino, Il Giorno)
LexisNexis Academic
H5: Redistributive Is the file redistributive or regulatory-
redistributive by nature? 0 = no, 1 = yes
Commission Proposal
H6: Preference 
presidency
Is the procedure mentioned in the priorities 
of the presidency concluding the act and/
or the preceding presidency? 0 = no, 1 = 
yes
Presidency Programs
H7: Time in use Number of years fast-track legislation has 
been possible at the time of conclusion
Legislative Observatory
C1: Anticipation Has the procedure been concluded within 
20.7 months before EP elections? 0 = no, 
1 = yes
 
C2: Policy distance Absolute distance between national political 
parties of the rapporteur and the minister 
presiding over the responsible Council at 
the time of political agreement
Benoit & Laver, 2006
Nationality Is the rapporteur from the country holding 
the Council presidency? 0 = no, 1 = yes
Legislative Observatory
C3: Committee Binary variables for ECON, LIBE, ITRE, and 
TRAN
Legislative Observatory
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expert survey data (Benoit & Laver, 2006), we constructed a proxy variable 
for the absolute distance between the policy positions held by the political par-
ties of these two actors, and we expect increasing policy distance to decrease 
the likelihood of EA. Second, negotiations will be facilitated where key actors 
share a “linguistic and cultural background” (Rasmussen, 2011, p. 51). We 
therefore expect EA to be more likely where negotiators come from the same 
country. The dummy variable nationality takes the value 1 if the rapporteur 
is from the country holding the presidency at the time of political agreement; 
otherwise it is coded 0.
Finally, in the light of the descriptive statistics presented in Table 3, we 
constructed binary variables for the EP’s ECON, LIBE, ITRE, and TRAN 
committees. Table 3 showed these four committees as “extreme” cases: the 
former two fast-track files frequently, the latter two do so rarely. Including 
this control allows us to gauge whether a “committee effect” occurs when 
other explanatory factors are held constant.
Results and Analysis
As our dependent variable is dichotomous, we use binary logistic regression 
to test our hypotheses. This technique predicts the probability of concluding 
codecision by EA given specific values on the explanatory variables. Because 
the relationship between dependent and independent variables is nonlinear, 
we report odds ratios (eβ) besides the B coefficients. Odds ratios provide a 
more intuitive interpretation: for a unit change in x
i
, the odds of y = 1 change 
by a factor of eβ, holding all other variables constant. Odds ratios with values 
between 0 and 1 point to a decreasing likelihood of EA; odds ratios greater 
than 1 indicate increasing likelihood.
We estimated three models. H1 to H7 are tested in Model 1. Model 2 
adds the controls anticipation, policy distance, nationality and the committee 
dummies. Model 3 is a reduced model; it includes only those variables found 
to be significant (p < .1) in Model 2.
Table 5 reports the estimates for our models.8 In a nutshell, we find support 
for the impact of EU enlargement, legislative workload, complexity measured 
by the number of consulted committees, and the time fast-track legislation has 
been in use. Supporting evidence is also found for the effect of our control 
variables policy distance, nationality, and anticipation as well as for a “com-
mittee effect.”
Turning to the logit models, the McFadden-adjusted R2 statistic—which is 
sensitive to the number of predictors—ranges between .33 (Model 1) and .35 
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(Model 3), and the Nagelkerke R2 ranges between .51 and .54. Overall, their 
values are fairly satisfactory. The most efficient model is Model 3, with a low 
number of explanatory variables and the highest McFadden-adjusted R2.
In what follows, we discuss our findings in more detail.
H1 expected the likelihood of EA to increase with the number of negotia-
tors. The EU’s 2004 enlargement resulted in a particularly steep such increase, 
and it has a positive and significant effect, robust to different model specifica-
tions. Hence, legislative files concluded after May 1, 2004, are significantly 
more likely to be concluded as EAs.
H2 expected the likelihood of EA to increase with the number of negoti-
ated files and, thus, with legislative workload. In all three models, the effect 
is positive and very significant. More specifically, every extra procedure dur-
ing a presidency increases the likelihood of EA by a factor of about 1.03. This 
result is in line with Rasmussen’s (2011, p. 56) study of the relationship 
between workload and early conclusion.
Hence, the analysis corroborates H1 and H2 and backs our functionalist 
argument. Where actors are faced with increased transaction costs of internal 
coordination and information gathering—because they need to accommodate 
growing heterogeneity postenlargement, and because a packed legislative 
agenda puts pressure on resources—they will adjust extant incomplete rules 
so as to save costs. Fast-track legislation offers an opportunity to regain effi-
ciency by reducing the number of interlocutors in the informal arena and by 
capitalizing on the simple majority rule in Parliament.
H3 expected EAs to be particularly likely for complex and regulatory-tech-
nical issues. Based on two variables capturing complexity and one dummy for 
regulatory-technical files, two interaction terms tested the hypothesis. Neither 
of the interactions has a significant effect. Hence, H3 is disconfirmed. However, 
one of the two variables measuring complexity—the number of committees 
asked for their opinion on the Commission proposal—has a positive and sig-
nificant effect. That is, every additional EP committee consulted increases the 
likelihood of an EA with a factor 2.31 (Model 3). Thus, although a file’s reg-
ulatory-technical nature does not make EA more likely, issue complexity 
seems to play a role. This finding lends further support to our functionalist 
argument stressing efficiency gains: Consulting EP committees indicates a 
need for, and an investment in, coordination, information, and expertise, with 
the ensuing costs pushing decision makers into the informal arena. This find-
ing is also in line with Rasmussen’s (2011, p. 58) results. In her study, how-
ever, committee opinion measured political salience, and her expectations 
were disconfirmed accordingly.
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H4 expected EAs to be less likely where the legislative issue is salient. 
Given our focus on public interest and political opposition, this hypothesis was 
tested by measuring attention in the English-, French-, German-, and Italian-
language media. Our analysis does not support this hypothesis: files with a lot 
of media attention are similarly likely to be passed as EAs as are those that 
attract little attention.
H5 expected EAs to be less likely for redistributive and for regulatory-
redistributive issues. To test this hypothesis, we used two dummy variables 
for all files with an element of redistribution. However, our analysis discon-
firms H5, as both redistributive and nonredistributive legislation is routinely 
adopted early.
The tests of H1 to H5 thus back a functionalist argument based on effi-
ciency gains: Transaction costs are a strong incentive for actors to “go infor-
mal.” Yet although this argument is well suited to explain the causal effects 
of enlargement, workload, and complexity, it is less effective in accounting 
for the role played by policy area and issue saliency. H3 to H5 expected deci-
sion makers to choose informal procedures only for regulatory-technical dos-
siers. However, given that even redistributive and salient legislation is 
routinely adopted early, our explanation does not hold: Conflicting interests, 
political opposition, and public attention do not translate into demands for 
open and formal legislative debate and controversy, and, accordingly, do not 
prevent decisions from being shifted into the informal secluded arena.
H6 expected EA to be more likely where the legislative file is an ex ante 
defined agenda priority of the Council presidency. This hypothesis is not 
confirmed in the analysis. When a piece of legislation is mentioned in the 
program of the concluding or preceding presidency, its likelihood to be 
adopted early is moderately positive but not statistically significant. Our 
power-based distributive bargaining argument is therefore not backed by 
empirical evidence; either Council presidencies do not choose fast-track leg-
islation as a means to promote their policy priorities or their institutional 
position—albeit privileged—does not allow them to succeed when attempt-
ing to do so.9
H7, which expected the likelihood of EA to increase with time indepen-
dently of issue properties, is corroborated. The effect of the time in use 
variable is in the expected direction, strong, and robust to different model 
specifications. In Model 1, a unit change in time—that is, each additional 
year during which the Amsterdam Treaty has been in force—increases the 
likelihood of EA by a factor of 1.44 (p < .01). This finding is in line with 
Rasmussen’s (2011, p. 55) study of the 1999–2004 period. Controlling for 
the proximity of key negotiators, anticipation and committee effect (Models 
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2 and 3), time in use still has a strong and significant effect. To determine 
whether the collinear relationship between enlargement and time in use is 
problematic, we conducted several diagnostics. Standard tests based on the 
variance inflation factor confirm that the two variables are associated but that 
collinearity is not severe. We also estimated Model 3 without enlargement. As 
expected, the B coefficient for time in use increased, indicating that the omit-
ted variable captures part of its effect. However, with the exception of antic-
ipation, whose coefficient decreases and falls outside conventional levels of 
significance, the estimates are remarkably stable.
This finding supports our sociological institutionalist argument. Where 
informal norms of cooperation become engrained, and where decision mak-
ers are socialized into these norms, actors will choose to “go informal,” inde-
pendent of issue properties. Over time, informal decision making thus 
becomes the appropriate choice, allowing colegislators to capitalize on 
increasingly cooperative interorganizational relations in the informal arena. 
However, our results also pose a challenge for the sociological argument: 
Even in 2009, a significant number of codecision files continues to be 
decided formally, and follow-up qualitative research needs to uncover why 
decision makers, socialized into informal rule sets, choose not to fast-track 
those pieces of legislation.
We expected our first control variable, anticipation, to have a positive and 
significant effect prior to the 2004 and 2009 EP elections and the 2004 
enlargement. Indeed, during the 20 months preceding the “expected shock” 
(Leuffen & Hertz, 2010, p. 57), the likelihood of EA increases by a 1.65 fac-
tor (p < .1) in Models 2 and 3.
Policy distance between the EP’s rapporteur and the national minister in 
the Council has a modest effect. The B coefficient is small, and the change in 
the odds of Y = 1 is limited. Still, the coefficient is negative and significant 
in Models 2 and 3: as the ideological distance between rapporteur and minis-
ter increases, the chance for agreement in trilogue decreases. This effect, 
albeit small, underlines the importance of party politics in codecision: The 
likelihood of an EA increases where the key negotiators’ policy preferences 
approximate, and this typically happens when rapporteur and minister belong 
to the same famille spirituelle.
Nationality, our second control capturing negotiators’ proximity, has a 
strong and significant effect in the expected direction. When the EP’s rap-
porteur comes from the country holding the presidency, the likelihood of EA 
increases by a factor 2.26 in Model 2 and by a factor 2.36 in Model 3. In 
combination, the proximity of key negotiators—who represent their organi-
zations in informal trilogues—adds an important explanatory factor.
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Finally, we find strong first evidence of a “committee effect.” Ceteris pari-
bus, a codecision dossier dealt with by ECON and, especially, LIBE is signifi-
cantly more likely to be agreed early. In contrast, if a legislative file is assigned 
to ITRE or TRAN, no effect can be appreciated. Figure 3 shows the effect of 
time in use and LIBE, based on the estimates of Model 3. This important 
finding calls for systematic theoretical reflection on why decision makers in 
certain EP committees are so much more prone to “go informal.” Follow-up 
research should analyze whether variation can be explained by more general 
differences between parliamentary committees, such as type, size, and juris-
diction (Mattson & Strøm, 1995) or assignment and preference heterogene-
ity (Yordanova, 2009); or whether explanations need to draw on factors 
specific to codecision, such as interaction between committee and rappor-
teur, relations between committee and Council formation, or a committee’s 
experience in colegislation.10
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Figure 3. Impact of time in use and LIBE committee on Early Agreements (EAs)
Estimates from Model 3.
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Conclusion
Our study introduced and explained a puzzling and understudied trend in EU 
politics: informal and secluded legislation in the Fifth and Sixth EP. Fast-track 
legislation displays all characteristics of informal decision making: A restricted, 
noncodified set of actors operates in a secluded setting; negotiation is struc-
tured by informal rather than codified, specific, and enforceable rules; and 
any pre-agreement must be formalized. The informal politics of codecision, 
is, therefore, an ideal test case for scholars with a wider interest in the 
dynamics and causes of informalization and seclusion.
By introducing the mechanisms behind fast-track legislation and by pre-
senting the scope and spread of EAs across types of legislation, our article 
responds to a pertinent question raised by EU scholars, policy makers, and 
civil society alike: Are first and early second reading deals struck only on 
noncontroversial and technical legislation, or are they also used for salient 
and redistributive files? Even based on our restricted definition of EAs—
factoring out all noncontested procedures—the figures demonstrate a dra-
matic informalization of decision making since 1999. Fast-track legislation 
therefore matters qualitatively as well as quantitatively.
More specifically, our analysis of codecision between mid-1999 and mid-
2009 suggests that informalization is systematically related to EU enlarge-
ment, legislative workload, complexity, and the time fast-track legislation has 
been in use. Evidence also points to the relevance of political and national 
proximity of key negotiators and to a strong “committee effect.” Yet we find 
no link between the choice to “go informal” and policy type, issue saliency, or 
the Council presidency’s priorities.
Our findings therefore strongly support a functionalist argument based on 
efficiency gains; fast-track legislation can reduce the transaction costs of inter-
nal coordination (where participants and workload increase) and of informa-
tion gathering (where a file is complex). The analysis also corroborates a 
sociological institutionalist argument suggesting socialization into informal 
norms of cooperation; the longer EAs have been used, the more informal 
decision making becomes the appropriate choice. However, there is no sup-
porting evidence for an argument drawn from distributive bargaining theory; 
in spite of its privileged institutional position, the Council presidency cannot 
use fast-track legislation for policy gains. Furthermore, as even salient and 
redistributive acts are regularly passed as EAs, an explanation based on the 
absence of public interest and political opposition carries little weight. This 
could be for one of two reasons: Either actors in Council and Parliament do 
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not encounter significant internal opposition where “going informal” undercuts 
broad controversy and open debate, or decision makers move a file into the 
informal arena precisely to avoid publicity and opposition. Neither of these 
reasons would be good news for the democratic credentials of fast-track 
legislation: The first would suggest that public debate is systematically 
undercut, the second would imply that informalization occurs because—
rather than in spite—of contestation.
In sum, our article makes an empirical, a theoretical, and a normative con-
tribution to the study of EU legislative politics and informal decision making 
more generally. Empirically, we analyze the spaces left by the formal rules of 
codecision and demonstrate the extent and scope of informalization and 
seclusion; theoretically, we develop an analytical framework that can explain 
why decision makers do or do not choose to use these informal spaces; and 
normatively, our systematic evidence on the type of legislation that is agreed 
early puts the democratic evaluation—and criticism—of fast-track legislation 
onto firmer empirical ground.
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Notes
 1. In short, we do not look at informal institutions that compete “with the state’s 
claim to binding decisions, by striving to establish parallel areas of competence” 
(Lauth, 2000, p. 25; also see Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, pp. 727-728).
 2. The Committee on Legal Affairs and Internal Market—the predecessor of JURI 
and IMCO—is excluded, as it was active in only the first years analyzed here.
 3. We also coded a file’s “word length” but dropped this variable to avoid collinear-
ity problems (the correlation between word length and recitals is .76).
 4. Based on Lowi (1972), policy types are analytically distinguished according to 
their distributive, redistributive, regulatory, or constituent character. The under-
lying argument is that policy attributes give rise to political conflicts, for exam-
ple, between “haves” and “have-nots” in the case of redistributive policy, but do 
not trigger conflict in the case of distributive policy where all are treated equally.
 5. The recitals and committee opinion variables have been recentered to reduce a 
problem of multicollinearity between the main and the interaction effects.
 6. The time boundaries for the search operations were the dates the Commission 
proposal was tabled and the legislative act was concluded.
 7. We would like to thank Frank Häge for suggesting this measurement.
 8. The number of observations in the models is slightly lower than the number of 
procedures analyzed because some procedures do not indicate the rapporteur, 
resulting in missing values on policy distance and nationality.
 9. In light of this finding and the literature on EU presidencies, we ran additional 
tests. Being a presidency priority may matter only when an experienced and/or 
big member state is in the chair. Therefore, we created an interaction term includ-
ing the variable preference presidency and a dummy coded 1 if one or both of 
the relevant presidencies were (a) one of the six largest members states and (b) a 
second-time presidency since the introduction of codecision in 1993. Neither the 
interaction term nor the main effect was statistically significant.
10. As a first step, we assessed whether our functionalist argument about number of 
participants and legislative workload also holds for parliamentary committees. 
To do so, we analyzed whether a committee’s workload (measured as the total 
number of procedures as well as the number of codecision procedures in a legis-
lative term) and size (measured as the number of committee members) increases 
the likelihood of EA. Workload does not have an effect; the effect of committee 
size is positive but small.
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